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Software patents are commonly criticised for being fuzzy, context-sensitive, and of-
ten granted for trivial inventions. More often than not, these shortcomings are said  
to be caused by the abstract nature of software—with little further analysis offered.  
Drawing on Plato’s  Parmenides, this paper will argue (1) that the reason why  
software patents seem to be elusive is that patent law suggests to think about al-
gorithms as paradigmatic examples and (2) that Plato’s distinction between two  
modes of predication and the role of competence in his account of knowledge are  
helpful not only for conceptualising knowledge of algorithms, but also for under-
standing the limits of software patent regimes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Judging from the software patent debate, algorithms seem to be an elusive 
matter. (1) James Bessen and Michael Meurer (2007), for instance, hold that 
‘software patents have especially severe boundary problems’, because soft-
ware  patent  claims  employ  ‘functional  language’,  which  is  abstract  and 
therefore imprecise; what is more, they add (2008, p. 195) that software pat-
ent claims do not use ‘abstract terms’ by coincidence,  but rather because 
‘many of the standard terms of art [in software engineering] are themselves 
abstract ideas’. (2) Sherly Abraham (2009, sec. 6), correspondingly, argues 
that  software  patents  trouble  patent  offices  and  courts  alike  because  al-
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gorithms, which is what software consists of, may perform different func-
tions in different contexts.1 (3) Jan Bergstra and Paul Klint (2007, sec. 8.1), by 
contrast, note that if the way in which algorithms are applied is not taken 
into account, what is left may be too insignificant to qualify for patent pro-
tection;  and  indeed,  many—Hartmut  Pilch  (2004,  p.  290)  even  claims 
‘most’—software patents appear to be trivial. More often than not, these dif-
ficulties are described as a consequence of the nature of algorithms: (1) al-
gorithms are abstract, thus their boundaries are fuzzy; (2) algorithms are 
underdetermined, thus their function is context-dependent; (3) algorithms 
express logical truths, thus they tend to be trivial. Put in a nutshell, we are 
often told that algorithms are less than ideal candidates for patent protec-
tion because they are ideal objects.
Andrew Chin (2009, p. 200), however, points out two problems with this 
explanation: (1) formulating patent claims is ‘an exercise in abstraction’ at 
any rate, so that ‘it is not immediately clear why the abstract nature of soft-
ware should pose a special problem for the determination of patent scope’; 
(2) computer scientists and engineers seem to be able to communicate pre-
cisely about algorithms, regardless of their abstract nature. That is not to say 
that software patents work, the evidence gathered by Bessen and Meurer 
(2008, sec. 9.1.1) establishes beyond doubt that they do not, but we need a 
more  complex  explanation  why  algorithms  seem  to  turn  fuzzy,  con-
text-sensitive, and trivial as soon as they are the subject of a patent law suit. 
That being so, the purpose of this paper is to propose such an explanation; 
starting from the assumption that the characteristics displayed by ideal ob-
jects,  including  algorithms,  in  the  context  of  patent  litigation  depend, 
among other factors,  on the model of ideal objects that patent examiners 
and judges employ.2 To be precise,  in this paper ‘model of ideal  objects’ 
refers to a set of—possibly implicit—assumptions about: (1) the functions of 
ideal  objects,  (2)  the way in which they perform these functions,  and (3) 
their ontological status in connection therewith.
So  what  model  of  ideal  objects  informs  patent  law?  Rudolph  Peritz 
(2008, p. 249) argues that the US patent regime ‘seems to require a separa-
tion of inventions from ideas’,  Jeffrey Lefstin  (2008,  note 210) makes the 
1 Most of the literature on (1) and (2) focuses on the US, but should apply mutatis mutandis 
to other jurisdictions.
2 This approach is inspired by Thomas Powers (2005), who argues that the ‘meandering of 
case law’ (p. 99) regarding copyright is a consequence of judges holding different views 
about the nature of ideal objects.
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similar observation that the US Patent Office appears ‘to have committed it-
self to a form of metaphysical  realism’, and Ben Klemens (2008, pp. 6–7) 
notes that algorithms in particular are often maintained to enjoy some kind 
of independent  existence.  Put  differently,  patents  seem to come bundled 
with Platonism. More precisely, they seem to come bundled with Plato’s 
theory of forms, which traditionally (see, e.g., Vlastos 1954) is taken to im-
ply that: (P1) ideal objects function as standards that are used to determine 
whether real objects possess certain predicates (e.g., there is an ideal object  
‘redness’, to which we compare real objects in order to determine whether 
they are red);  (P2)  they perform that  function  by being  paradigmatic  in-
stances of the predicates the usage of which they regulate (e.g., ‘redness’ is  
the paradigmatic red); (P3) in order for them to be able to perform that func-
tion, they need to be thought of as existing independently of real objects 
(e.g., ‘redness’ exists besides red things, rather than inhering in them). Fol-
lowing Peritz, Lefstin, and Klemens, it seems safe to presume that patent ex-
aminers and judges alike draw on a model of ideal objects that is congruent 
with the traditional reading of Plato’s theory of forms.
Thus, the objective of this article can now be stated more precisely as fol-
lows:  to assess whether the fact that algorithms tend to appear as fuzzy, 
context-sensitive,  and trivial  in the context of patent litigation can be ex-
plained in terms of the theory of forms. This will be done by drawing on 
Plato’s Parmenides (1997), in which he not only discusses some weaknesses 
of that theory, but also how these weaknesses could be addressed and why 
we are inclined to think of ideal objects along the lines of the weak version 
of that theory. Having said that, there is no scholarly consensus on how the 
Parmenides should be interpreted; the reading employed here draws, among 
others, on those of Constance Meinwald (1991; 1992) and Wolfgang Wieland 
(1999). Since Plato’s arguments need to be brought to bear on an example, 
the  algorithm ‘Ron’s  Code 4’  (RC4)  will  be  outlined  in  the  next  section
(sec. 2). To this algorithm the so-called ‘Third Man Argument’, which—for 
the purposes of this  paper—is the most interesting criticism Plato brings 
forward against his theory in the  Parmenides (p. 132a–b), will  then be ap-
plied (sec. 3). After that, the reasons that he identifies for which people tend 
to make assumptions about ideal objects that correspond to the weak ver-
sion of the theory of forms (sec. 4) and the modifications that he proposes to 
rectify this theory will be related to the patent system (sec. 5). To conclude, 
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the implications of these findings for current software patent regimes will  
be discussed (sec. 6). With reference to James Bessen and Robert Hunt (2007,
p. 167), the term ‘software patents’ is used in this paper to refer to all pat-
ents that encompass ‘a logic algorithm for processing data that is implemen-
ted via stored instructions’; notably, this includes patents on computer-im-
plemented inventions.
2. RC4
RC4 is a cipher that encrypts a given plaintext by combining it with pseudo-
random numbers that are generated from a given key, it was developed by 
Ronald Rivest in 1987 for RSA Laboratories (see Mantin 2001, sec. 1.2). What 
makes RC4 such an apt example for the purposes of this article is that it can 
be understood without too much prior knowledge in computer science or 
mathematics—in contrast to more recent ciphers such as RC5 or RC6. What 
may seem to render RC4 a somewhat odd example, however, is that it has 
not been patented; but, in all likelihood, this is only because RC4 was leaked 
to the general public in 1994, that is, before algorithms were established as 
patentable subject matter in the US by the decision in State Street Bank and  
Trust v. Signature Financial Group,  149 F.3d 1368 (1998).  RSA Laboratories 
has applied for and been granted patents for RC5 (US patent no. 5,724,428) 
as well as RC6 (US patent no. 5,835,600), the successors of RC4.
How does RC4 work? Similar to many other ciphers, RC4 comprises two 
components: a key scheduling algorithm (KSA), which initialises a pseudo-
random generation algorithm (PRGA). First, the KSA creates an ordered list 
that ranges over all possible byte values, so that every value occurs once 
and only once (i.e., it counts from 0 to 255). Then, it swaps the elements of 
that list, where the elements that are to be swapped with each other are de-
termined by the key provided. This list is called the ‘substitution box’. Us-
ing that substitution box, the PRGA first swaps two elements of that box in 
order  to  ensure  that  its  output  remains  pseudo-random  even  for  large 
amounts of data and then selects another element of the box as pseudo-ran-
dom byte. Different to the KSA, the PRGA uses only the current state of the 
substitution box to determine which elements are to be swapped. With the 
PRGA initialised by the KSA, the plaintext is encrypted by xoring each of its 
bytes with one pseudo-random byte generated by the PRGA (for more de-
tails see Thayer & Kaukonen 1999).
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To illustrate, the following code, written in the programming language 







  j = 0
  for i in range(256):
     j = (j + self.S[i] + key[i % len(key)]) % 256
     self.S[i], self.S[j] = self.S[j], self.S[i]
def prga(self):
  self.i = (self.i + 1) % 256
  self.j = (self.j + self.S[self.i]) % 256
  self.S[self.i], self.S[self.j] = (self.S[self.j], 
    self.S[self.i])
  return self.S[(self.S[self.i] + self.S[self.j]) % 256]
Listing 1: RC4 in Python
With this  description of RC4 in mind,  we may now turn to the later 
Plato’s analysis of the weaknesses of his middle-period theory of forms and 
see how this analysis applies to that algorithm.
3. ALGORITHMS AND THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT
Plato’s Third Man Argument (TMA) discusses precisely the model of ideal 
objects  that  has  been  argued  to  be  employed  by  patent  examiners  and 
judges. What the TMA, with reference to Andreas Graeser (2003), is meant 
to show is that a model of ideal objects that includes the assumptions (P 1), 
(P2), and (P3) is inapt to formulate definite description of any ideal object 
(such  a  model  will  hereafter  be  referred  to  as  ‘TMA-model’  for  short). 
Gregory  Vlastos  (1954)  and  S.  Marc  Cohen  (1971),  among  others,  have 
shown that the TMA can be proven for more formalised versions of (P 1), 
(P2), and (P3), but for the purposes of this paper a simplified account of the 
TMA will do: (1) Suppose, there are two red flowers. (2) Since both of them 
are red, there must be some kind of form they have in common, namely red-
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ness. (3) Since redness is not particular to any single thing, redness must ex-
ist independently of those things. (4) Since, according to the TMA-model, 
forms are thought of as paradigmatic instances, redness is the paradigmatic 
red. (5) But might we then not just as well ask what those two flowers and 
the ideal object ‘redness’ have got in common, that is, by virtue of what the 
red flowers and redness are related? How does redness,  when looked at 
with ‘the mind’s eye’ (Parm., p. 132a), differ from the two red flowers? To 
sum up, according to the TMA-model, ideal objects on the one hand func-
tion as standards that inform our judgements about real objects, but on the 
other hand are understood to be so similar to real objects that one could 
rightly ask why ideal objects should be any better in performing that func-
tion than real ones. What the TMA shows is that this question cannot be 
answered on the basis of (P1), (P2), and (P3).
To illustrate, let us go through the TMA using RC4 rather than red as 
our example. First, have a look at the following code, written in the pro-
gramming language  Perl, which also implements RC4’s KSA (called ‘new’ 
in this example) and PRGA (‘prga’):
package RC4;
sub new {
   my ($class, $self, $j) = (shift, {S => [0 .. 255]});
   for(my $i=0; $i<256; $i++) {
$j = ($j + $self->{S}->[$i] + $_[$i % @_]) % 256;
($self->{S}->[$i], $self->{S}->[$j]) = 
($self->{S}->[$j], $self->{S}->[$i]);
   }
   bless($self, ref($class) || $class); return $self;
}
sub prga {
   my $self = shift;
   $self->{i} = ($self->{i} + 1) % 256;
   $self->{j} = ($self->{j} + $self->{S}->[$self->{i}]) % 256;
($self->{S}->[$self->{i}], $self->{S}->[$self->{j}]) = 
       ($self->{S}->[$self->{j}], $self->{S}->[$self->{i}]);
return $self->{S}->[($self->{S}->[$self->{i}] + 
$self->{S}->[$self->{j}]) % 256];
}
Listing 2: RC4 in Perl
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Although the earlier piece of code (listing 1) and this one (listing 2) are 
different,  any person skilled  in  the  art,  in  this  case,  a  programmer who 
knows  Python as well as  Perl, will be able to tell that both of them imple-
ment the same algorithm. Put differently, they share the same form. So how 
can this form be spelled out? Usually, if the logical structure of an algorithm 
shall be illustrated, programmers use so-called ‘pseudocode’, that is, a de-
scription of the algorithm in natural language that mimics the structure of 
programming languages. Using such pseudocode, RC4’s KSA and PRGA 
can be presented as follows:
class RC4
S := { 0, ..., 255 }
   i := 0
   j := 0
method ksa(key)
j := 0
for i := 0 to i = 255 do
   j := (j + self.S[i] + key[i mod length(key)]) mod 256
   swap i with j in self.S
method prga
   self.i := (self.i + 1) mod 256
   self.j := (self.j + self.S[self.i]) mod 256
      swap self.i with self.j in self.S
   return self.S[(self.S[self.i] + self.S[self.j]) mod 256]
Listing 3: RC4 in pseudocode
We may be tempted to say that any code that implements the structure 
described above is an instance of RC4, but then we would have to explain 
the difference between the earlier examples (listing 1 and 2) and the pseudo-
code above (listing 3) that renders the latter but not the former able to func-
tion as a standard—and that turns out to be difficult. For if somebody asked 
‘what is the common logical structure of the pieces of code depicted in list-
ings 1, 2,  and 3?’, then that question would appear to be no less justified 
than the same question asked only for listings 1 and 2. That is, listing 3 fails  
to answer that question in a satisfactory manner, but this is what we would 
expect from a standard. Moreover, if we tried to answer what the listings 1,  
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2, and 3 have in common, all we would end up with is yet another descrip-
tion of RC4—for which  yet  another  question  of  the same kind could be 
posed. We could continue like this indefinitely, without ever arriving at a 
description that could be used as standard of what counts as instance of 
RC4.
How does this relate to software patent litigation? To answer this ques-
tion  we need to review  two interpretations  of  the  TMA: Wieland (1999,
pp. 118–124) and Graeser (2003, sec. 4) agree that the regress just outlined 
obtains because the TMA-model reifies ideas, which means in this case that 
ideas are treated as objects,  that is,  as bearers of properties,  that exist  on 
their own. Wieland argues that such a treatment implies that ideas (1) tend 
to be removed from the contexts of their application,  and that (2) know-
ledge of them is thought of as propositional, that is, as being structured sim-
ilarly to beliefs, which often can be expressed as a relation between an ob-
ject and a predicate (more on this in sec. 5).
This allows to account for the fact that algorithms tend to appear as (1) 
fuzzy, (2) context-sensitive, and (3) at times trivial to patent examiners and 
judges as a consequence of them relying on the TMA-model. (1) What the 
TMA shows first and foremost is that descriptions of ideas as paradigmatic 
instances need to be contextualised in order to be able to guide our judge-
ments, that is, they do so to a larger extent than ordinary descriptions used 
in everyday life. Put simply, they seem to be fuzzy. For the same reason, (2) 
attempts to describe an idea as paradigmatic instance not only fail  to in-
clude the idea’s context of application, so that the resulting ideal objects will 
be applicable to a wide range of contexts, but also (3) tend to be unable to 
capture the inventive step needed to come up with a particular algorithm. 
Take, for instance,  the description of RC4 given by listing 3. To be sure, 
there is nothing outstanding about any single instruction in that listing, sim-
ilar instructions can be found in many other algorithms, yet that does not 
imply that RC4 is trivial. Quite to the contrary, the actual innovation of RC4 
is that such a simple algorithm can encrypt data in a secure manner, but this 
is nothing that can be seen from listing 3. Metaphorically speaking, if we are 
looking  for  an  innovation  in  such  descriptions,  then our  ‘mind’s  eye’  is 
looking in the wrong direction.3
3 That is not to say that there are no trivial software patents, but that the impression that a 
significant number of them is trivial might, at least in part, be caused by patent examiners, 
judges, and others drawing on the TMA-model of ideal objects.
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Having said that, some may wonder why patent examiners and judges 
would rely on such a dysfunctional model of ideal objects in the first place. 
Plato does not address this explicitly, but some of his arguments provide 
helpful clues, to which we will turn now.
4. WHY PATENT EXAMINERS AND JUDGES MAY BE 
PLATONISTS
Plato, in spite of having shown that reifying ideas is fallacious, insists that 
the assumptions that lead to that reification perform important functions, so 
that they are difficult to avoid. To be precise, Plato advances two arguments 
in the Parmenides that may explain why patent examiners and judges tend to 
rely on the TMA-model: (1) We could not engage in any serious discussion,  
if we did not have some kind of idea of the subject matter at hand, that is, if  
we did not have a standard that allows us to assess each other’s arguments 
as true or false, but in order to function as such a standard ideas must not  
be subject to our whim and be shared by all participants of the discussion—
both of which suggests them to enjoy a certain degree of independence from 
us (cf. p. 135a–c). (2) Without forms, that is, if we did not assume them to  
somehow exist,  statements about immaterial objects such as ‘Pegasus has 
wings’ would be meaningless, for there is no such thing as a real horse with 
wings that ‘Pegasus’ could refer to, yet such statements clearly are meaning-
ful. If they were not, we would not even be able to deny that Pegasus exists,  
for in order to assert that nothing in the (material) world is Pegasus, we 
need to know what ‘Pegasus’ refers to (cf. pp. 160b–164b). Plato finds these 
two arguments to establish beyond doubt that we need to assume that there 
are forms,  regardless of  the difficulties  that  seem to follow from this  as-
sumption.
Wieland (1999, pp. 118–124) construes this result to imply that the way 
in which we use ideas differs depending on whether we draw on them to 
assess an argument or whether we make them the subject of an argument, 
to wit, that doing the latter may compel us to think about that idea as some 
kind of object, causing the regress described by the TMA; this is illustrated 
by the following two sentences:
(S1) These roses are red.
(S2) Redness is a colour.
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Whereas ‘red’ in (S1) functions as predicate, so that we will tend to think 
of red as a property that some real objects happen to possess, ‘redness’ in 
(S2) functions as subject, to the effect that we seem to treat redness as if it 
were a proper object. What is more, expressing the content of (S 2) without 
reifying the property ‘… is red’ to an ideal object ‘redness’ is tricky and the 
result would sound fairly contrived, at least in Indo-European languages. 
To put this differently, which assumptions about ideas (or ideal objects re-
spectively) are functional depends on the role an idea plays in our judge-
ments, that is, on whether that idea informs a judgement about something 
else or is itself the subject matter about which a judgement is made.
We can now see why patent examiners and judges should find the TMA-
model appealing: the ideas embodied by patents are the subject matter not 
the standard of their judgements, at least, insofar as these judgements con-
cern patents. For instance, how could one apply the doctrine of equivalents 
without assuming, at least implicitly, that there is some kind of ideal object 
that patent claims or inventions embody and that functions as a yardstick to 
which  the software accused of infringing on a patent  can be compared? 
What is more, for such a comparison to make sense, there must be some 
kind of correspondence between the standard that is used to assess an ob-
ject and the object that is assessed, and intellectual property law in general 
seems to suggest that this  correspondence can be thought of as one that 
holds between a pattern and its exemplifications. Put bluntly, being a Pla-
tonist is part of the job description of patent examiners and judges.
Graeser (2003, sec. 4), however, points out that the metaphysics of the 
TMA-model is at odds with some of Plato’s other writings and regards this 
as evidence that Plato intends the TMA to show that any reading of his the-
ory of forms that reifies ideas is misguided. So patent examiners and judges 
may be able to be Platonists without subscribing to the TMA-model after 
all. To assess this we will now review how Plato addresses the TMA.
5. RECTIFYING PLATO’S MODEL OF IDEAL OBJECTS
Plato, in the light of the TMA and other similar difficulties, (1) explores an 
amendment to his theory of forms and (2) clarifies the functions that forms 
can perform in different contexts, both of which are interesting avenues for 
a possible reform of software patents.
(1) Meinwald (1991; 1992) construes the second part of the  Parmenides 
(pp. 135a–166c) to introduce a distinction between two modes of predica-
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tion: predications pros ta alla (in relation to others) are ordinary predications 
(e.g., ‘this flower is red’ or ‘RC4 was invented by Ronald Rivest’), they ex-
press a relation between an object (e.g., the flower or RC4) and something 
else (e.g., the colour red or Ronald Rivest); predications pros heauto (in rela-
tion to itself), by contrast, express the relation between natures of concepts 
(e.g., ‘redness is a colour’, ‘RC4 is a cipher’), similar to a genus-species tree 
(see illustration 1). Thus, Meinwald holds that the TMA obtains because the 
theory of forms put forward by the middle-period Plato fails to distinguish 
between these two modes of predication;  in  other words, descriptions of 
ideal objects along the lines of the TMA-model are fuzzy because they ab-
stract from real objects, instead of focusing on the relation between an ideal  
object and other ideal objects that occupy a higher position in its genus-spe-
cies tree.
Illustration 1: Genus species tree for RC4
(2) Wieland (1999) claims that Plato emphasises  throughout all  of his 
writings that knowledge (which for Plato is always the knowledge of forms) 
has two sides: on the one hand, knowing something about x implies having 
a belief  about  x,  that  is,  knowledge is  structured similar  to  propositions 
(know-that); on the other hand, knowing x implies being capable of making 
judgements about x, that is, knowledge also requires a certain kind of com-
petence (know-how). Thus, knowledge cannot be reduced to being aware of 
the truth of certain propositions, but also requires that one is competent in 
how these propositions relate to different contexts. Wieland (pp. 118–124), 
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therefore, argues that the TMA ensues from employing the principles of the 
theory of forms in the wrong way; there is no meaningful answer to the 
question what two red flowers and the idea of redness must have in com-
mon in order for the two flowers to count as exemplifying redness, because 
this confuses the normative and the descriptive function of ideas.
Neither of these two proposals, however, can be readily applied to soft-
ware patent litigation. (1) Of course, appreciating the  pros ta alla/pros heato 
distinction allows for more accurate descriptions of ideal objects, but doing 
so requires some knowledge about the nature of the ideal object described, 
and that knowledge may simply be unavailable. For example, the relation 
between a key and the stream of pseudo-random numbers that RC4 gener-
ates from that key is part of the nature of RC4, that is, the way in which RC4 
operates necessitates this relation, yet the fact that this stream of pseudo-
random numbers can easily be distinguished from truly random numbers 
had not been realised until eight years after RC4 had been leaked to the gen-
eral public (see Mantin & Shamir 2002). Put simply, algorithms are a com-
plex subject matter, so that understanding their nature will  require a fair 
amount of research, but that research takes time and can begin only after 
the algorithm has been published—and the patent claim already been filed.
(2) Making the ‘right’ use of ideas is easier said than done, especially if  
you are a patent examiner or judge and giving grounds for which some 
piece of software should or should not count as infringing on a patent claim 
counts as ‘wrong’. Plato, at least according to Wieland, would argue that 
such a giving of grounds must come to an end, and that people who truly 
know the idea under consideration must at that point accept good grounds 
simply by virtue of being competent to make good judgements regarding 
that idea. To put this differently, Plato would argue that patent examiners 
as well as judges (and lawyers for that matter) should refrain from discuss-
ing algorithms, unless they are competent to make good judgements about 
their nature. That, of course, is quite high a demand to make, after all, most 
judges  and lawyers,  are  not  computer  scientists  or  mathematicians;  put 
bluntly, this is not part of their job description.
6. CONCLUSION
To  sum  up,  it  was  shown  above  that  algorithms  appear  as  fuzzy,  con-
text-sensitive, and trivial if they are described in accordance with the TMA-
model of ideal objects (sec. 3) and that there are good reasons to suppose 
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that patent examiners and judges rely on that very model (sec. 4). Plato’s  
proposals for avoiding the TMA-model, by contrast, were found to be diffi-
cult to apply to patent litigation (sec. 5). To be sure, refining the principles 
of patent law, for instance, the doctrine of equivalents, in accordance with 
the pros ta alla/pros heauto distinction or setting up specialist courts for soft-
ware patents may improve upon the status quo, but the way in which the 
patent  system works  limits  the  prospects  of  those  measures.  Ultimately, 
Samuel Beckett’s famous advice may be all that is in store for any attempt to 
reform the software patent regime: ‘Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try 
again. Fail again. Fail better.’
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